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In The Supreme Court
of the State of Utah

FRANK H. FULLMER,
Plaintiff-respondent,
vs.

PARLEY J. BAKER,

Case No.
12969

Defendant-appellant.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF
NATUUE OF CASE
This is an action to recover the purchase price for
failure to deliver shares of stock which were to be delivered "within one year" from the date of the agreement of purchase.

DISPOSITION OF CASE BY J_.OWER COURT
The lower Court granted judgment for $5,000.00
which was the purchase price for the shares of stock.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The judgment for $5,000.00 should be reversed and
judgment entered ordering delivery of the shares or
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the case should he remanded to determine the valur
the shares not delivered.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On or about l\J arch 15, 1970, the Plaint
FRANK l<'ULLl\IER (FULLl\IER), and the!
fendant, PARLEY UAKEit (BAKER), execut

a written agreement ( R. 9) under which FULL~l!
agree<l to pay ~5,000.00 for 20,000 shares of stocl
l.F.C., a Utah corporation. The $5,000.00 was pain
BAKER by check ma<le payable to l.F.C. Thefo
were paid directly to the corporation (R. 72). Theagrr
ment provided that the shares were to be delirn
"within one year from the date" of the agreement"fr
from all encumbrances." llowever, time was not m<
the essence of the agreement, and there was no evidet
that FULLl\IER needed or wanted the shares bya:
particular date. The agreement was not a loan of ~i.11
but a purchase of the 20,000 shares for $5,000.00 [l
75).

FULLMER testified that he asked for [.
shares soon after the agreement was signed (R. ~·
awl that he knew the shares were owned personallr

BAKER (R. 69). However, FULLMER mader
further request or demand for the shares during l

entire year of the agreement although the shares we
available to him at any time (R. 92-93). BAKER~
.
d. h
. ment and !O
forgotten the date stipulate mt e agieeh
h !Jis:
after that date passed FULLMER, t roug ·
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tornev, demanded a refund of the $5,000.00. Upon receivir;g the demand, BAKER immediately contacted
FULLMER and tendered the shares to him, but
FULLMER refused them. This action was then commenced and BAKER renewed his tender of the shares
in his answer.
ARGU:MENT

I.
DEFENDANT'S T E N D E R OF THE
SHARES TO PLAINTIFF AFTER THE YEAR
EXPIRED PREVENTS ACTION FOR
BREACH OF THE AGREEMENT SINCE
TIME \VAS NOT THE ESSENCE OF THE
AGREEl\IENT.
FULLl\1"ER'S testimony indicated that he made
only one request for delivery of the shares to him and
that was soon after the agreement was signed and long
before delivery of the shares was due under the agreement. He made no other requests or demands for the
shares and apparently decided to let one year pass, hoping that BAKER would forget the date on which delivery was due. He then made demand for return of his
money and refused to accept the shares which had been
available to him at any time during or after the year.
Although there is no showing in this case as to the
value of the shares, either when purchased or at the
end of the year, it is obvious that the reason for FULLIVIER'S position is that the shares had decreased in

value. It is also obYious that had the shar ·
.
'
' es lllcrea1,
m. value, FULLl\IER would have demanded delir;r
of the shares eyen after the vear ex1)ired H h :
.J
•
e as a,,
rnitted that the purpose of the agreement wa t ·
•
s opu:
chase the shares from llA KER under whi.ch h
'
e ll'OU:.
be taking the risk of increase or decrease in valueau'
ing the year. Now he wants to back out of whatwa
apparently a bad bargain and place the risk of thatk
gain on B1\..KER.
.
1

BAKER'S failure to deliver the shares withinlfr

year was inadvertent. The shares were a\'ailable forur
liYery at any time and upon being reminded of theool
gation he immediately tendered the shares. Wht
FULLl\lER refused the tender, a formal tenderwa
made of the shares through IlAKER'S attorney. Agai:
FULLl\lER refused and commenced this action.

1

The agreement did not provide that time was it'
essence of the agreement nor does the evidence shoi
any compelling reason why the shares had to beat
livered on .l\Iarch 15, 1H71. FULLMER did notshoi
that the date of delivery macle any difference to himo:
that the failure to deliver ou March 15, 1971, cau)ll
any damage to him. The law is clear that time is nG:
the essence of an agreement unless the agreement ti·
· reement
· o f tlle ag
pressly so states an d t lle natme
· 1·mg circumstances
·
on I~
SUITOUIH
ma k es per f 01..-nance
...
stipulated date a necessary term of the agreement.'\
· l\ 1·issouri· h ave expIore d this quesbo'd.
series of cases m
thoroughly and so determined. In Tamko Asphalt Pr'
11

'
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/l'cni.r, 321. S.,V. 2d 527 (l\fo. 1958), the
agreement contained a ''time being of the essence"
clause and yet the court found that the parties did not
so intend because other provisions of the agreement
demonstrated a contrary intent. That case relied upon
the earlier cases of Eric City Iron Worlcs v. Ferer, 282
S.\V. 470 (l\Io. 1926) and Ottumwa Bridge Co. v. Corrigan, 251 l\Io. 667, 1.58 S.vV. 39. The Erie case held
that a contract for delivery of a boiler on a specific date
was not breached by delivery after that date so as to
justify repndia tion an<l refusal to take delivery since
time was not made and did not appear to be of the essence. The refusal to take delivery was due to the availability of a better price elsewhere. The case of Lane v.
N111111, 243 S.vV. 427, 211 Mo. App. 280 (1922) held
that in an agreement to repurchase shares of stock "at
the expiration of one year," time was not of the essence, and the defendant was required to repurchase
the shares even though the request to repurchase was
not made until one month after the end of the year. The
court stated:
ucfs, Inc. t'.

"'Vhere a contract has been mutually and
fairly entered into by both parties and time is
not expressly made the essence of the contract
and neither party has expressly repudiated it
(in this ease plaintiff notified defendant she
wanted him to take the stock), one party cannot evade its obligations on the ground of delay of the other, unless he shows damage to
himself by such delay, or such an unreasonable
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or intentional and willful delau as w1"Jl ·
·'
evince
an intention on the part of the delaying party
to treat the contract as at an end."
The Ottumwa Bridge case, supra, quoted~
adopted the opinion of the federal court in Beck&Pa:
Lith, Co. v. Colorado IJlilling & Elevator Co., 52Fi
700 (8th Cir.) as follows:

"It is a general principle governing the

construction of contracts that stipulations as
to the time of their performance are not neces·
sarily of the essence, unless it clearly appears
in the given case from the express stipulations
of the contract or the nature of its subject
matter that the parties intended performance
within the time fixed in the contract to be a
condition precedent to its enforcement, and,
where the intention of the parties does not so
appear, performance shortly after the time
limited on the part of either party will not
justify a refusal to perform by the party ag·
O'rieved ' but his only
remedv.I will be an action
b
•
or counterclaim for the damages he has sus·
tained from the breach of the stipulation.
"This contract shows no intention on the
· for
date given
P art of either party to make the
· essence, IIl
· the
the completion of the work of its
sense ihat an action may not be brought upon
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it for recovery of the contract price upon completion and acceptance at a later date; and
the law will not presume such an intention
unless there is something in the nature of the
work that makes the completion at that time
an element in its permanent value, or the date
serves a temporary purpose that is an important inducement to the undertaking."

FULLl\lER'S failure to show any damages resulting from delay or that the delay was unreasonable
or willful so as to indicate an intention not to perform
or that there was any reason why he had to have performance ou the date stipulated prevents recovery in an
action for breach. A case which is very similar to the
case now before the court is Vorwerk v. Nolte, 87 Cal.
2:rn, 2;j Pac. 112. In that case an agreement for the
purchase of lawl provided that "time is of the essence
of this contract" and that the seller would return the
pmd1ase price if he failed to execute and deliver a conveyance of the property "after one year from the date
hereof." The court held that the time for conveyance,
though stipulated, was not the essence of the contract.
Those words applied only to the obligation to pay the
purchase price which had already been paid. Therefore,
tender of conveyance after the time stipulated prevented
the buyer from obtaining a refund. Of course, the agreement now before this court did not provide that time
was the essence nor did it provide for return of the purchase price if the shares were not delivered when agreed.
1
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Consequently, this case is even stronger than Voru
and the tender of .i)erformance here should also~·
the buyer from obtaining a refund.
·

II.

"r

EVEN ASSUMING THE AGREEME:i
AS BREACHED FOR 'FAILURE TO n,
I,IY"E.R THE SHARES BY THE AGREl
DATE, PLAINTIFF'S REMEDY IS NOH
FUND BUT DAMAGES CAUSED BY TR
UREACH. P L A I N T I F F SHOULD i
PLACED IN THE POSITION HE won
IIA YE OCCUPIED HAD THE AGREE~!E!
IlEEN PERFOR~lED.
It has already been mentioned that FULU!I
sought the best of both worlds by asking for refunn
his money when his bargain was found to be a poor!'
He would obviously have demanded delivery oil
shares had their value increased while he sat sileK
by'. The law bas always attempted to compensare
'~ronged party by placing him in the position he WOl
have occupied had his agreement been fully perforrrt.
.
. f ound'22t
The 0aeneral law on this subJect
is
m ·
Jur. 2d Damages §§ 12 and 13:

§ 12.

Compensation as the general rule or
objective

Compensation is the stated goal of courts
· UlJUf
· · y or for
in awarding damages for tort1ous
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breach of a contractual promise. . . . With
contracts, compensation is most often stated in
terms of placing the plaintiff in the same financial position in which he would have been
had the promise not been broken.

§ i:J.

Compensation as limit of recovery.

. . The law will not put (the damaged
party) in a better position than he would be in
had the wrong not been done or the contract
not been broken."
Contrary to these propositions, the lower court
has placed FULLl\IER in a better position than he
would haYe occupied had the agreement been performed
to the letter. The agreement was a purchase of shares
to be deli\·erecl in the future. BAKER tendered delivry shortly after the stipulated date. Had the shares not
heen tendered, FULL.MER could have sued for specific performance or for the value of the shares. Hower er, since the shares were tenderd, :FULLMER'S
remedy was for damages caused by the delay-which
he failed to show in this case. To quote again from the
Beck & Pauli case, supra at 702:
"... performance shortly after the time
limited on the part of either party will not
justify a refusal to perform by the party aggrieved, but his only remedy will be an action
or counterclaim for the damages he has sustained from the breach of the stipulation."
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}_,,ULLl\IER did not seek, nor did he h ,
S 011 I
dama?es .for delay or breach, and the court er~d
entermg Judgment for refund of the purchase ·
pn~1

III.
THE FACT THAT THE SHARES Pt:
CHASED BY PLAINTIFF '\7ERE NOT REi
ISTERED WITH THE UTAH SECURITII
COl\ll\lISSION OR THE SECURITIES AJ1
EXCHANGE COl\I:MISSION DOES NOTCOJ
STITUTE AN "ENCUl\lBRANCE" UPON TR
SHARES.
Although the lower court did not expressly son~]
it is apparent that it considered the shares to bet
cumbered by the fact that they were not registered!!
sale to the public with the Utah Securities Commi~i
or the Securities and Exchange Commission. Thisstei
from the agreement which states that the shares"~
now, and will at all times during the period of It
agreement be, free from all encumbrances." It snol
be obvious that if the shares were not registered at~
time the agreement was signed, there was no reqwr
ment that thev be registered at the time of delin~
Otherwise, the. "are now" and "will ... be" clauseL
no meaning. The shares when tendered were in exar:
the same status as when purehase d. N o "enc umbranl\
intervened. The argument that FULLMER couldr
·
· no t relevant wri:r
resell the shares to " JUSt
anybody " is
considered in the light of the fact that the agretDl

~

:

r

r
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does not require or contemplate resale of the shares by
FULLMER. Furthermore, the shares could have been
leaally
resold by FU LLMEH, under the securities
ti
•
laws, in the same kind of isolated (non-public) transaction in which he purchased the shares from BAKER.
The word "encumbrance" is usually applied to
real property and is "any right to or interest in land
which may subsist in third persons to the diminution of
the value of the interest or estate of the landowner but
which does not conflict with his conveyance of the fee."
Hebb v. Severson, 32 \\!ash. 2d 159, 201 P. 2d 156, at
mo; Tahoe National Rank v. Phillips, 92 Cal. Rptr.
704', 712, 480 P.2d 320. This commonly understood definition relates to interests which "third parties" might
holll against the property and includes mortgages, taxes
arnl assessments. The same definition can apply to personal property. In contrast, it is also understood that
restrictive ordinances or other governmental statutes
or regulations, which are imposed on land or its use or
transfer pursuant to police power, are not encumbrances
within a covenant against encumbrances. Hall v. Risley,
188 Or. 69, 213 P.2d 818, 826; Fritts v. Oerul.:os, 273
N.C. 116, 159 S.E. 2d 536, 539; see also Lohmeyer v.
Bower, 170 Kan. 442, 227 P.2d 102; Rincon Band of
Indians v. San Diego County, 324 F. Supp. 371, 377
(D.C. Cal.) ; JVilson v. Calvert, 96 F. Supp. 597, 601
(D.C. Ariz.). These cases cover restrictions on land
pursuant to ordinances regulating its use, the location
or character of buildings permitted thereon, reservations
of mineral rights, as well as restrictions on transfer.
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Again the • same
principles applv
to personal
•
.1
•
proper\'
Any restrictions on the sale or transfer of sIiares ·
stock pursuant to governmental statute or re gu]a101,
1.·
such
as registration with the Utah Securities COlli!llli"
•
s1on or the Securities and Exchange Commission riv
to "public distribution," is therefore not an en~
brance, and the lower court was in error to so find Xi
liens, mortgages, taxes or assessments and no other~
terests of "third parties" were shown to exist agailli
the shares tendered to FULLMER, and therefore fi
encumbrances existed to justify refusal of the tender.
11;

CONCLUSION
Although a specific date for performance wmtl
forth in the agreement, time was not made the essenCT
of the agreement. .F'ULI .~I ER did not show a111
reason why performance was vital or necessary on tnt
specified date. In fact, if performance on that datenal
1

been necessary, he need only have notified BAKER
and he could have had the shares. Instead, he waitro
silently until the date had passed and then demanaro·
a ref nnd without asking for the shares or gi11ni
BAKER a chance to deliver them. BAKER'S tenner
of the shares upon being reminded of his obligation
t an ac
amounts to complete performance and preven s

• !'!Ill

tion for breach. The lower court was therefore me ,
· · dgroen1
to find a breach of the agreement and to give JU
for the purchase price.
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Should the court determine that the agreement
was breached for failure to perform on the agreed date,
FULLl\IER'S remedy is the damages caused by the
delay or failure to perform on that date. The judgment
rendered in this case was in no way related to any Joss
caused to F ULLl\lER by the failure to perform on a
date certain. In fact, no damages were even shown. The
pnrpose of the law in awarding damages is to place the
injmed party in the same position he would have occupied had there been no breach. Delivery of the shares
nr a judgment for their value on the agreed delivery
date would have fully compensated FULLMER. The
judgment entered below places FULLMER in a better position than full and timely performance of the
agreement would haYe done, and it should therefore be
rerersed.
Finally, the word "encumbrance" as used in the
agreement was not shown to have any meaning different
from that commonly understood in connection with real
property. Encumbrance refers to such things as mortgages, taxes and assessments held by or due to third
parties hut does not in any way relate to governmental
restrietions upon the use or transfer of property. These
things are matters of Jaw and are presumed to be known
by all persons who deal in the property. Lack of registration of the shares for public distribution is not an
encurnbrance and does not prevent the resale of the
shares in the same kind of private transaction by which
FULLMER purchased the shares. The lower court's

14'

determination that the shares were not free from,
cumbrances should therefore be reversed.
Respectfully submitted,

BACKMAN, BACKMAN & CLAR

Ralph J. Marsh

